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24 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Preparation of a Fifteen Year Intelligence Program

1. We understand that the purpose of preparing a fifteen year intelligence program is to provide guidance to US intelligence which will enable it to better meet its responsibilities from now until 1980. This means that in preparing the program questions must be posed which will elicit guidance for the planning of more effective support of policy officials and intelligence operations and which will enable us to determine the resources required to ensure this support. The attached papers and some of our intra-Office discussion on this program outline raise doubts as to whether we are asking the right questions and providing the best planning assumptions. As a minimum it would seem that, before we formulate our objectives and the resources and activities required to meet them, we should take into account the following elements:


a. The trend of events in the world situation, posed not merely in terms of an estimate but of some of the major uncertainties involved. While there is always the danger of over-refining these judgments, we believe that an expansion of the assumptions identified in Phase One would be essential.

b. Closely related to this trend of events would be our customers' projection of what it is they are likely to need, together with our own expectations in this regard so that we can make the best use of the available lead time.

c. Phase Two of the outline which deals with the needs of intelligence must be considered not only in terms of specific programs which must be formulated to meet intelligence requirements but must be considered in their relationship to their effect on other intelligence objectives. During the preparation of the fifteen year program the myriad of inter-relationships involved here will obviously require extensive iteration with a large number of intelligence components. If a particular program is carried out to meet specified intelligence needs, it may reduce the need for other programs and increase the requirements in some others where major inputs are required to

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support that specific program. Moreover, if certain intelligence programs are successful they may make possible certain important lines of research and analysis which, in the first instance, might not have been judged sufficiently feasible to warrant inclusion in the objectives of intelligence production components. Because of this complex situation, any long-term objectives identified by individual Offices are subject to adjustment.

d. There is also the question of CIA's future role within the intelligence structure with respect to a significant number of intelligence activities. What OHR plans to do, for example, depends in part on our expectations of the trend of intelligence capabilities in DIA and INR and their programs for external research.

It would seem then that in laying out a terms of reference for the establishment of an intelligence program the above considerations are fundamental to the identification of objectives and to the ultimate determination of the resources required to achieve them, that is, the numbers of people, equipment, training, program costs, etc.

The attached papers were all prepared on a few hours notice and are not to be taken as the definitive views of OHR. They do, however, indicate a number of considerations which should be taken into account in developing the terms of reference. It is assumed that subsequent reviews of the program will allow time for more systematic and thoughtful development of suggestions. This, of course, would permit more effective use of the tremendous professional experience at all levels in the Agency and the experience of certain outsiders (e.g., Missell) as well.


OTTO E. GURNE
Assistant Director
Research and Reports

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Enclosures: 4 Papers, as stated

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